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Re: IPsec +- Perfect Forward Secrecy |  |
- To: John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Subject: Re: IPsec +- Perfect Forward Secrecy
- From: Eric Rescorla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2004 11:18:28 -0800
- Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
- In-reply-to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (John Denker's message of "Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:45:15 -0500")
- References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Reply-to: EKR <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>> Uh, you've just described the ephemeral DH mode that IPsec
>> always uses and SSL provides.
>
> I'm mystified by the word "always" there, and/or perhaps by
> the definition of Perfect Forward Secrecy. Here's the dilemma:
>
> On the one hand, it would seem to the extent that you use
> ephemeral DH exponents, the very ephemerality should do most
> (all?) of what PFS is supposed to do. If not, why not?
>
> And yes, IPsec always has ephemeral DH exponents lying around.
>
> On the other hand, there are IPsec modes that are deemed to
> not provide PFS. See e.g. section 5.5 of
> http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2409.html
Sorry, when I said IPsec I mean IKE. I keep trying to forget
about the manual keying modes. AFAICT IKE always uses the
DH exchange as part of establishment.
-Ekr
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