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Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 "attacks" |  |
- To: Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Subject: Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 "attacks"
- From: Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 18:09:39 -0500
- Cc: Ondrej Mikle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Cryptography <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- In-reply-to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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I thought the usual attack posited when one can find a collision on a
source checksum is to make the desired change to source, then tinker
with something less obvious and more malleable like lsbits of a UI
image file until you find your collision on two input source packages.
Adam
On Tue, Dec 14, 2004 at 10:17:28PM +0000, Ben Laurie wrote:
> >>But the only way I can see to exploit this would be to have code that
> >>did different things based on the contents of some bitmap. My contention
> >>is that if the code is open, then it will be obvious that it does
> >>"something bad" if a bit is tweaked, and so will be suspicious, even if
> >>the "something bad" is not triggered in the version seen.
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