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Re: SSL/TLS passive sniffing
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  • To: Florian Weimer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  • Subject: Re: SSL/TLS passive sniffing
  • From: John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  • Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 11:49:18 -0500
  • Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  • In-reply-to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  • References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  • Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
.
 
Florian Weimer wrote:

Would you recommend to switch to /dev/urandom (which doesn't block if
the entropy estimate for the in-kernel pool reaches 0), and stick to
generating new DH parameters for each connection,

No, I wouldn't.

> or ...
generate them once per day and use it for several connections?

I wouldn't do that, either.




If the problem is a shortage of random bits, get more random bits!

Almost every computer sold on the mass market these days has a sound
system built in. That can be used to generate industrial-strength
randomness at rates more than sufficient for the applications we're
talking about.  (And if you can afford to buy a non-mass-market
machine, you can afford to plug a sound-card into it.)

For a discussion of the principles of how to get arbitrarily close
to 100% entropy density, plus working code, see:
  http://www.av8n.com/turbid/


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