Re: (pacsec bonus) Re: VMWare Detection?

[Mike Tremoulet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>]

On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 21:36:04 -0600, Lance Spitzner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Lots of great discussions and tools demonstrated on detecting the use
> of VMware.  Some pondering, if I may.
> 
> - In reference to honeypots, is the detection of VMware a bad thing?
> Okay, the attacker gains access and identifies the system is using
> VMware.  Lots of legitimate organizations use VMware, the economics of
> virtualization can be a big motivator.  In fact, this will potentially
> grow.  So, I would contend that the detection of VMware does not
> automatically mean honeypot.

I agree with the contention, but can we also separate the versions of
VMWare?  (Say, the desktop from the server editions of the product?) 
I'm more likely to believe a company running their web server farm on
the server edition, not the desktop edition, of VMWare.

> - If an attacker does detect VMware, and assume its a honeypot and
> leaves the system, does this mean that VMware is  potentially more
> secure for production systems?
> 

If your assumption is true, then this holds.  That's a big if.  My
concern with VMware (or UML, or coLinux, or qemu, or Virtual PC, or
any other virtualization technology) is that it is ultimately a
program written by people.  Like any other software, that program will
have flaws.  So I could as easily (in my opinion) see an attacker
detecting VMware and launching a different set of attacks aimed at
controlling the physical host.  This may be an acceptable risk on a
honeypot, but to rely on this for a production system makes me uneasy.

> - If attackers or automated threats do begin running automated
> detection mechanisms for VMware, would it not then be possible to put
> those very same signatures into legitimate systems, so threats now
> avoid them?
> 

See above.  You may avoid threats, but may invite a different set of
threats.  Admittedly might not be valid without the virtualization
software running, but still - you rely on the strength of your decoy
instead of more solid prevention/countermeasures.

-- Mike

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