Re: protection of results

[Adrian Midgley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>]

On Monday 01 November 2004 23:20, Andrew McLean wrote:

> >will result in a +/- 3% accuracy. As one of then said "if the result
> >appears to say Bush will win by 2%, then problems with the sample could
> >mean that actually Kerry might win by 1%".

So what cryptographic safeguards should public policy in the UK include on 
electronic voting machines to ensure that it is unfeasible to suborn 
sufficient of them in the home (county let us say) of the manufacturing firm 
should that firm's leaders be committed to one result rather than another and 
the predicted result for the constituency be within the margin or error of 
the polls, and the result sufficient to swing the whole of a general election 
one way or the other?

An unusual and hypothetical situation, as I'm sure everyone will agree, but 
possibly even on topic.

-- 
Adrian Midgley                   Open Source software is better
GP, Exeter                       http://www.defoam.net/