Re: protection of results

[Brian Beesley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>]

On Sunday 07 November 2004 21:59, Adrian Midgley wrote:
> On Monday 01 November 2004 23:20, Andrew McLean wrote:
> > >will result in a +/- 3% accuracy. As one of then said "if the result
> > >appears to say Bush will win by 2%, then problems with the sample could
> > >mean that actually Kerry might win by 1%".
>
> So what cryptographic safeguards should public policy in the UK include on
> electronic voting machines to ensure that it is unfeasible to suborn
> sufficient of them in the home (county let us say) of the manufacturing
> firm should that firm's leaders be committed to one result rather than
> another and the predicted result for the constituency be within the margin
> or error of the polls, and the result sufficient to swing the whole of a
> general election one way or the other?

What's wrong with printing a paper slip so that, in the event of a dispute, 
votes can be recounted by hand in the traditional manner?

Come to think of it, why not just have the voter mark a piece of paper in the 
first place?

Can I patent this idea?
>
> An unusual and hypothetical situation, as I'm sure everyone will agree, but
> possibly even on topic.

I wonder if the fact that electronic voting systems were in use in at least 
some counties in at least some of the critical states in last weeks US 
Presidential Election might be responsible for the significant difference 
between the exit polls and the votes counted.

Brian Beesley